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The purpose of this article is to introduce a Cartesian product struc-
ture into the social choice theoretical framework and to examine if
new possibility results to Gibbard’s and Sen’s paradoxes can be de-
veloped thanks to it. We believe that a Cartesian product structure
is a pertinent way to describe individual rights in the social choice
theory since it discriminates the personal features comprised in each
social state. First we define some conceptual and formal tools related
to the Cartesian product structure. We then apply these notions to
Gibbard’s paradox and to Sen’s impossibility of a Paretian liberal. Fi-
nally we compare the advantages of our approach to other solutions
proposed in the literature for both impossibility theorems.
1 Introduction
Could society forbid me to read a book considered as perverse if I wanted
to? Or, on the contrary, could society compel me to read it if I did not want
to? What values should society invoke to force me to paint the walls of my
room in the same color as my neighbor’s?
These questions refer to some impossibility theorems developed in the
social choice theoretical framework devised by Arrow [1], such as the liberal
paradox (Sen [24], [25]) or Gibbard’s result [8]. Since Sen’s seminal article,
∗CODE, Edifici B, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, 08193 Bellaterra, Cer-
danyola del Vallès, Barcelona, Spain (e-mail: igersheim@cournot.u-strasbg.fr or higer-
sheim@idea.uab.es).
Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology through grant
BEC2002-002130 and FEDER is gratefully acknowledged. I thank Claude d’Aspremont,
Miguel A. Ballester, François Maniquet, Anne Pétron-Brunel, and Maurice Salles for help-
ful comments.
1
there has been an extensive literature concerning the treatment of individual
rights in economics. According to Mill [16] and Hayek [14], the existence of
a personal protected sphere in which individuals are free to do what they
want seems to be acknowledged. In 1970, Sen introduced this concept into
the social choice theoretical framework with a condition of liberalism based
on the notion of decisiveness: individuals must be decisive – their preferences
must be acknowledged by society – over some pairs of social states, which
belong to their private sphere. Sen shows that this condition of liberalism
and a weak Pareto principle lead to an impossibility of social choice: it is
the impossibility of a Paretian liberal. But Sen’s formal analysis does not
need to distinguish between decisive pairs that enable an individual to take
decisions that are “personal” to her and those that are not. Formally, Sen
makes no distinction between a man deciding whether to sleep in a prone or
supine position, and a religious leader dictating whether he does so. Gib-
bard [8] investigates this issue: he uses a Cartesian product structure to
describe individual rights and points out the internal inconsistency caused
by an extended condition of liberalism. This result is called Gibbard’s para-
dox or Gibbard’s First Libertarian Claim. Besides, Gibbard shows that his
paradox arises only if individuals express conditional preferences. In other
words, an individual expresses conditional preferences if her preferences de-
pend on those of another individual. For example, Connie is said to have
conditional preferences if her desire is to wear a dress of the same color as
Anita’s. On the contrary, if Anita’s desire is to differentiate from Connie, it
leads to Gibbard’s paradox. Gibbard stresses that his paradox does not arise
if unconditional preferences only are acknowledged by society. It is Gibbard’s
Second Libertarian Claim, which solves the problem caused by the internal
inconsistency of individual rights. However the liberal paradox still occurs
with unconditional preferences.
This topic gave rise to many debates and attempts to develop new tools
to take individual rights into account and to solve Gibbard’s and Sen’s para-
doxes. The purpose of this article is to introduce a Cartesian product struc-
ture on social states and to examine if new possibility results can be devel-
oped. We believe that the Cartesian product structure is a pertinent way
to describe individual rights in the social choice theory since it discriminates
personal features comprised in each social state. Consequently, the concept of
personal protected sphere is clarified. Although some authors already intro-
duced a Cartesian product structure on social states (see especially Gibbard
[8], Hammond [10], [11], [12], Coughlin [4], Pétron-Brunel and Salles [18]),
this has never been applied in a thorough way to Gibbard’s result and to
Sen’s paradox.
But a Cartesian product structure is inadequate in itself in order to deal
2
with both impossibility results. It is necessary to determine a relevant way to
take into account the implementation of these individual rights thus clarified.
Indeed a formal right granted by society to an individual does not imply a
real right since other individuals are able to prevent her from exercising it,
i.e., other individuals can express “invasive” preferences towards her protected
sphere. We propose two definitions so that individual rights can be guaran-
teed. The first definition aims to distinguish individuals’ “strong” and “light”
preferences between two options: if an individual prefers red to blue and blue
to white, her preference between red and white is said strong. Hence, if she
prefers her neighbor’s living-room to be painted in red whereas her neighbor
wishes to paint it in white, she has an invasive preference into her neighbor’s
protected sphere. In other words, an individual expresses an invasive prefer-
ence if she has a strong preference over two social states, which belong to the
private sphere of another individual, and if that individual has the inverse
preference. This statement of invasive preferences corresponds to our second
definition. Finally, some possibility results for Gibbard’s and Sen’s theorems
are designed by preventing one or several individuals from having invasive
preferences. Even if possibility results, which follow the same line of reason-
ing have been already proposed (see Sen [26] or Pétron-Brunel [17]), ours
extend the domains devised by these authors and require weaker constraints
on individual preferences thanks to the Cartesian product structure.
The organisation of the rest of the paper is as follows. In the second
section we define some conceptual and formal tools related to the Cartesian
product structure. In the third section we apply these notions to Gibbard’s
paradox. The fourth section is devoted to Sen’s impossibility of a Paretian
liberal. The fifth section provides a discussion of the advantages of our
approach compared to other solutions proposed in the literature for both
impossibility theorems. The sixth section concludes.
2 Some conceptual and formal tools related to
the Cartesian product structure
LetN = {1, 2, ..., n} be the finite set of individuals1, which constitutes society
(n ≥ 2). With a Cartesian product structure on social states, each individual
is concerned about a set X of personal features, this set being the same for
all individuals. X is a finite set, where |X| ≥ 2. A social state is a n-list
(x1, x2, ..., xn) of personal features of the world, where xi ∈ X, ∀ i ∈ N . The
1The mathematical concept of n-list can then be called upon. See Salles [23].
3
set of all social states Xn is given by
Xn = X ×X × ...×X︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−fold
.
Each individual i ∈ N has a binary relation ºi on Xn, which is a linear
ordering. A n−list of individual preferences (º1,º2, ...,ºn) is designed by
d. A collective choice rule f specifies a social preference relation for each d:
º= f (d) . If º is a complete pre-ordering for all d in the domain, f is a “social
welfare function” (SWF) in the sense of Arrow [1]. A weaker requirement is
that º must be complete and acyclic for all d in the domain2. In this case,
f is called a “social decision function” or SDF (see Sen [25], p. 52).
Thanks to the Cartesian product structure on social states, we can now
describe individual rights. Let us just define a few more notations: for any i ∈
N and any x = (x1, ..., xi−1, xi, xi+1, ..., xn) ∈ Xn, x−i = (x1, ..., xi−1, xi+1, ...,
xn), where x−i ∈ Xn−i. If xi ∈ X and a−i = (a1, ..., ai−1, ai+1, ..., an) ∈ Xn−i,
then (xi; a−i) = (a1, ..., ai−1, xi, ai+1, ..., an). The personal sphere of individual
i is the family of sets {Di(a−i)}a−i∈Xn−i where Di(a−i) is defined as follows:
Di(a−i) = {x ∈ Xn | x−i = a−i} .
Two social states belong to a set of individual i’s personal sphere when they
differ only in the personal feature of this individual.
As stated in our introduction, the difficulty we face with the problem of
individual rights in the social choice theory is less analytical than conceptual.
Consequently, it is crucial to find out first which values could be wished by
the members of society and how they can be guaranteed.
According to Mill ([16], pp. 4-5, emphasis added): “protection (...)
against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there needs protec-
tion also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling ; against
the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its
own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them
(...). There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with
individual independence: and to find that limit, and maintain it against en-
croachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as
protection against political despotism”.
The “limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion” Mill de-
scribes is the personal or private sphere of an individual. Inside it, an in-
dividual is free to decide. Sugden ([28], p. 229) adopts the same point of
view: “it is perfectly consistent to claim, as Mill did, that every individual
2A binary relation º on Xn is acyclic if x º z follows x Â y and y Â z for any
x, y, z ∈ Xn.
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is entitled to an area of life to be controlled by himself or herself alone –
however meddlesome or fashion-conscious or jealous or otherwise unworthy
people’s preferences may be”. Society should not give a formal right to an in-
dividual for this does not match a real right of action: “if a person’s religious
meditation is made impossible through loud and disturbing noises made by
others (...), his or her liberty is violated, even though this violation does not
take the form of prohibiting the mediater from choosing his or her own acts
or strategies” (Sen [27], p. 142). Hence it is essential to determine a way to
achieve effective rights. As stated by Hausman and McPherson ([13], p. 125):
“rights typically involve both ‘privileges’ for the right-holder and correlative
duties for others” or Gaertner, Pattanaik and Suzumura ([7], p. 173): “every
active right of [individual] i implies the freedom of i (...) from a certain set of
options or actions; and i’s choice of one of these options, in its turn, implies
obligations of certain other agents to do or not to do something”. Obviously,
effective rights can be achieved by constraining individual preferences.
To summarize: each individual has a private sphere in which she is free
to act. However some invasive preferences of other individuals should be ex-
cluded so that her formal rights can be real. All authors acknowledge the fun-
damental necessity of protecting individual rights. Therefore our resolution
of Sen’s and Gibbard’s impossibility theorems takes this basic requirement
into account.
Nevertheless, one issue is still unsolved: how to define invasive prefer-
ences? In order to do so, two definitions are developed below.
The first one deals with the status of an individual preference between
two social states: it could be strong or light. Some authors such as Blau
[3], Saari ([19], [21]), Pétron-Brunel [17], and Saari and Pétron-Brunel [22]
already inquired about this topic, i.e., how to introduce more information
into individual preferences. The idea is the following: when listing a binary
ranking coming from a transitive ranking, also specify if other alternatives
separate two social states. If there is any, this individual preference between
these social states is called a strong preference. If there is none, the preference
is said light. Actually, our definition establishes how to evaluate the status
of an individual preference between two social states.
Definition 1 Strong and light preferences For any x, y ∈ Xn, for any
j ∈ N, if x Âj y and if there exists at least one z ∈ Xn such that x Âj z
and z Âj y, then individual j strongly prefers x to y: it will be denoted by
T [x Âj y] = S. If x Âj y but if such a social state z does not exist, individual
j lightly prefers x to y: it is denoted by T [x Âj y] = L.
For example, let us consider the following individual linear ordering:
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Xn = {x, y, z, w} and x Âj w Âj z Âj y. By transitivity, x Âj y. We
then obtain T [x Âj y] = S. However if x Âj y Âj w Âj z, T [x Âj y] = L.
Our second definition aims to characterize individual invasive preferences.
In fact, we now have at hand all conceptual and formal tools to deal with
this issue. An invasive preference arises if an individual j goes against a
preference of another individual i in her personal sphere; in other words, if
two options, x and y, belong to the personal sphere of i and if j strongly
prefers x to y whereas i prefers y to x. Let us characterize the set of options
coming from j’s invasive preferences. It is denoted by Yj and called “set of
invasive options”. Let individual j be fixed. Consider two options x and y
and suppose that x Âj y with T [x Âj y] = S. Suppose moreover that x and
y belong to another individual i’s personal sphere, i.e., they belong to some
Di(a−i), and that y Âi x. Then y ∈ Yj(a−i) where Yj(a−i) is a subset of
Yj which is composed of all options y coming from an invasive preference of
individual j on a given Di(a−i). Hence, for an individual j, the set Yj is the
union of all subsets Yj(a−i) over every a−i ∈ Xn−i and over every i 6= j3.
Definition 2 Set of invasive options For a given d, the set Yj is com-
posed of all social states for which the individual j has a preference which
goes against a preference of another individual i 6= j in her personal sphere:
Yj(a−i)=
{
y ∈ Di(a−i) | T [x Âj y] = S for at least one x ∈ Di(a−i)








For example, consider two individuals 1 and 2 and X = {r, w}. Thus,
Xn = {(r, w), (w, r), (r, r), (w,w)}. Suppose that individual 1 has the follow-
ing linear ordering: (r, r) Â1 (w, r) Â1 (w,w) Â1 (r, w). Suppose moreover
that (r, w) Â2 (r, r) and (w,w) Â2 (w, r). Hence, since (r, w), (r, r) ∈ D2(r)
and T [(r, r) Â1 (r, w)] = S, Y1(r) = {(r, w)}. And since (w,w), (w, r) ∈
D2(w) and T [(w, r) Â1 (w,w)] = L, Y1(w) = ∅. Finally, Y1 = {(r, w)}. But,
if (r, r) Â1 (w, r) Â1 (r, w) Â1 (w,w), all other things remaining equal, then
Y1 = {(r, w), (w,w)} since T [(w, r) Â1 (w,w)] = S.
Sen’s and Gibbard’s theorems can now be presented and some possibility
results be proposed thanks to the exclusion of invasive preferences.
3Note that it would be possible as well to gather in a set all pairs of social states (x, y)
coming from such a preference. But, in both cases, our results would be the same.
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3 A solution to Gibbard’s paradox
First of all, let us describe briefly Gibbard’s result [8]. It is based on an
extended interpretation of the concept of personal sphere: every individual
should be decisive over all pairs of social states, which differ only in her
personal feature. Gibbard suggests the following condition:
Condition 1 (GL) First Libertarian Claim For any x, y ∈ Xn, for any
i ∈ N , for any a−i ∈ Xn−i, if x, y ∈ Di(a−i) and x Âi y, then x Â y.
Moreover, the collective choice rule f should respect the condition of
unrestricted domain:
Condition 2 (U) Unrestricted domain The domain of f includes all lo-
gically possible n-lists of individual linear orderings.
The extended condition of liberalism proposed by Gibbard [8] and the
condition of unrestricted domain bring about an internal inconsistency of
individual rights: there is no SDF satisfying conditions U and GL.
Thanks to the conceptual and formal tools elaborated above, a possibility
result for Gibbard’s theorem can be developed. More precisely, a condition
constraining the number of individuals with an empty set of invasive options
is defined:
Condition 3 (PM1) Preference Modification 1 Yk = ∅,∀ k ∈ K where
K ⊆ N and |K| ≥ n− 1.
It should be understood that condition PM1 is a restriction of condition
U: it requires that at least (n−1) individuals of society should have an empty
set of invasive options. The following proposition can then be stated:
Proposition 1 There exists a SDF satisfying conditions PM1 and GL.
Proof The theorem is proved by constructing a SDF, which gives each
person i an appropriate special voice on her feature. Let Q be the relation
between x and y,
(∃i)[x, y ∈ Di(a−i) and x Âi y].
Let º= f(d) be generated from Q in the following manner:
∀x, y ∈ Xn : x º y ⇐⇒ ¬(yQx).
Firstly, we prove that whenever yQx, y Â x. Suppose that ¬(y Â x).
Hence x º y and from the construction of f , we have ¬(yQx). Then, from
¬(y Â x), it followed that ¬(yQx); therefore, if yQx, we obtain y Â x as
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asserted. Secondly, we show that f satisfies GL. By the construction of Q, if
x, y ∈ Di(a−i) and x Âi y, then xQy. Therefore, x Â y, and hence f satisfies
GL.
Next, we check that f is really a SDF, i.e., f is complete and acyclic.
Since Q is an asymmetric relation, f is necessarily complete. It remains
to be demonstrated that f is acyclic – that a cycle of the social preference
relation never occurs. Suppose there is a cycle O,
x1Qx2, ..., xτ−1Qxτ , xτQx1
where x1, ..., xτ belong to Xn (for the subscripts, we shall use mod τ arith-
metic, so that 1 − 1 = τ and τ + 1 = 1). Since individual preferences are
transitive, a single individual cannot bring about a cycle through condition
GL. Then at least two individuals lead to cycle O. Moreover, they are both
responsible for at least two steps of the social preference relation so that cycle
O can exist.
Now, consider the individual, which is responsible for the step x1Qx2 and
call her individual j. Then, x1 Âj x2. Individual j is necessarily responsible
for another step of the cycle xι−1Qxι, with ι = 4, ..., τ so that cycle O can
exist. Hence, xι−1 Âj xι.
Suppose that x1 Âj xι−1. From xι to xτ , steps originating from individuals
i 6= j or from individual j follow each other. In every case, we cannot
obtain xτ Âj xι−1 so that Yj can be empty. We necessarily have xι−1 Âj xτ .
Therefore, the step xτQx1 necessarily comes from an individual i 6= j. Hence,
T [x1 Âj xτ ] = S and Yj is nonempty. If xι−1 Âj x1, we can prove that Yj is
nonempty according to the same line of reasoning.
Finally, we showed that if individual j is involved in cycle O, her set
of invasive options is nonempty. But the same conclusion remains for any
individual involved in such a cycle. This violates the stipulation that at least
(n − 1) individuals of society should have an empty set of invasive options
and hence, cycle O cannot occur. The theorem is proved.
We discuss this result in section 5.
4 A solution to Sen’s paradox
The liberal paradox results from the incompatibility of three conditions that
constrain the collective choice rule: the unrestricted domain condition, the
weak Pareto condition, and a condition of liberalism. Since Gibbard’s para-
dox [8], the Second Libertarian Claim or a self-consistent rights system is
used as the third condition of Sen’s theorem (see, for example, Farrell [5],
Sen [26], Suzumura [30], or Pétron-Brunel [17]). This claim requires individ-
uals to express unconditional preferences in order to take their rights into
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account within the social preference relation. Before defining this condition,
a few more notations have to be stated: let xipiyi mean that the feature xi
is unconditionally preferred to yi by individual i. It is defined as follows:
(xi; a−i) Âi (yi; a−i) for all a−i ∈ Xn−i.
Condition 4 (GL’) Second Libertarian Claim For any x, y ∈ Xn, for
any i ∈ N, if x, y ∈ Di(a−i), x Âi y and xipiyi, then x Â y.
The weak Pareto condition used by Arrow [1] in his impossibility thereom
is as follows:
Condition 5 (P) Weak Pareto For any x, y ∈ Xn, if x Âi y for all i ∈ N ,
then x Â y.
The three conditions give rise to the liberal paradox: there is no SDF
satisfying conditions U, P, and GL’.
A resolution of the liberal paradox is proposed thanks to the set of invasive
options. Indeed, as for Gibbard’s result, a condition establishing how many
individuals have to exhibit an empty set of invasive options is devised:
Condition 6 (PM2) Preference Modification 2 ∃ j ∈ N such that
Yj = ∅.
Like condition PM1, condition PM2 is a restriction of condition U and
states that at least one individual should have an empty set of invasive op-
tions.
Proposition 2 There exists a SDF satisfying conditions PM2, P, and GL’.
Proof Let Q be the relation between x and y,
(∃j) x, y ∈ Dj(a−j), x Âj y and xjpjyj or (∀ i) x Âi y.
As in the proof of proposition 1, let º= f(d) be generated by Q in the
following manner:
∀x, y ∈ Xn : x º y ⇐⇒ ¬(yQx).
From the way Q is defined, it is obvious that f satisfies conditions P and
GL’. Next, we check that f is really a SDF, i.e., f is complete and acyclic.
Since Q is an asymmetric relation, f is necessarily complete. It remains to
be shown that f is acyclic – that a cycle of the social preference relation
never occurs. Suppose there is a cycle O,
x1Qx2, ..., xτ−1Qxτ , xτQx1
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where x1, ..., xτ belong to Xn (for the subscripts, we shall use mod τ arith-
metic, so that 1 − 1 = τ and τ + 1 = 1. Variables ι and κ will range from
1 to τ). First, let us consider how cycle O arises. Each step of this cycle
originates either from condition P or from condition GL’. It should be re-
alized that the cycle cannot be provoked either by condition P alone since
individual preferences are transitive, or by condition GL’ alone because it
implies a self-consistent rights system: therefore steps proceeding from both
conditions are necessary so that the cycle can exist. In addition, at least two
steps of the cycle originate from condition GL’ for two different individuals.
In fact, if only one step of the cycle comes from condition GL’, the individual
that is responsible for it expresses cyclic individual preferences, since all other
steps of the cycle come from condition P. Hence at least two steps originating
from condition GL’ for two distinct individuals and one step originating from
condition P lead to such a cycle. Now, consider xι−1Qxι. We get either (∀ i)
xι−1 Âi xι or ¬(∀ i) xι−1 Âi xι and (∃ j) xι−1, xι ∈ Dj(a−j), xι−1 Âj xι and
xι−1pjxι.
The next part of the proof comprises two stages: first we show that if an
individual is responsible for at least one step of the cycle because of condition
GL’, she has a nonempty set of invasive options (1). We then show that if
an individual is involved only in steps of the cycle originating from condition
P, she has a nonempty set of invasive options as well (2).
(1) We consider two individuals j and l: each of them is responsible for
a step of cycle O proceeding from condition GL’. Then there is a ι such that
xι−1, xι ∈ Dj(a−j), xι−1 Âj xι and xι−1pjxι and such that (∀ i) xι Âi xι+1.
Hence we get: xι−1 Âj xι and xι Âj xι+1. In addition, individual l is involved
in the cycle as well. There is a κ such that xκ, xκ+1 ∈ Dl(a−l), xκ Âl xκ+1.
and xκplxκ+1. Suppose that κ+ 1 = ι− 1, in other words, the step xκQxι−1
originates from condition GL’. It should be noted that this step can proceed
from condition P, but this does not modify our proof: there is somewhere
in the cycle a step originating from condition GL’ and from an individual
different from j. For individual j, we have either xκ Âj xι−1 or xι−1 Âj xκ
with T [xι−1 Âj xκ] = L so that Yj can be empty. In both cases, T [xκ Âj
xι+1] = S. Then, in cycle O, from xι+1 to xκ, steps necessarily come from
condition GL’. Hence, the set Yj is nonempty since j necessarily expresses
at least one strong preference against a preference of another individual’s
protected sphere in the following subpart of cycle O: xι+1Qxι+2, ..., xκQxι−1.
(2) The second stage of the proof requires to rely on the Cartesian prod-
uct structure. Suppose that an individual m is involved in cycle O only in
steps originating from condition P. According to (1), we get: xι Âm xι+1. For
individual m, we could have xι Âm xι−1 and T [xι Âm xι−1] = L, xι−1 Âm xκ
and T [xι−1 Âm xκ] = L, et cetera, if all steps from xι+1 to xκ proceed from
10
condition GL’. In every other cases, Ym is nonempty. In order to complete
this proof, we show that m’s above preferences necessarily imply a non-
empty set Ym. For individual j, recall that xι−1 Âj xι, xι−1, xι ∈ Dj(a−j)
and xι−1pjxι. For individual l, xκ Âl xι−1, xκ, xι−1 ∈ Dl(a−l) and xκplxι−1.
Let xι−1 = (x1, ..., xj, ..., xl, ..., xn), xι = (x1, ..., xj∗ , ..., xl, ..., xn) and xκ =
(x1, ..., xj, ..., xl
∗
, ..., xn). Since individuals j and l have to express uncondi-
tional preferences, we obtain (x1, ..., xj, ..., xl∗ , ..., xn) Âj (x1, ..., xj∗ , ..., xl∗ , ...,
xn) and (x1, ..., xj∗ , ..., xl∗ , ..., xn) Âl (x1, ..., xj∗ , ..., xl, ..., xn). But (x1, ..., xj,
..., xl
∗
, ..., xn) = xκ and (x1, ..., xj∗ , ..., xl, ..., zn) = xι. Let x∗ be the social
state (x1, ..., xj∗ , ..., xl∗ , ..., xn). Then individual m has to respect the pref-
erences of individual j in her personal sphere, xι−1 Âj xι and xκ Âj x∗,
and the preferences of individual l in her personal sphere, xκ Âl xι−1 and
x∗ Âl xι. According to m’s above preferences, Ym is nonempty since individ-
ualm necessarily expresses at least one strong preference against a preference
of individuals j or l in their protected sphere.
Hence statements (1) and (2) violate condition PM2: cycles cannot occur.
The theorem is proved.
5 Why does the Cartesian product structure
matter?
In the preceding sections, some possibility results for Gibbard’s and Sen’s
theorems have been established. It is then important to determine if these
results make it possible to alleviate some drawbacks brought about by other
resolutions proposed in the literature.
A chief advantage of conditions PM1 and PM2 is that these conditions
allow to solve Gibbard’s and Sen’s results in an almost identical way. In
fact, both conditions are based on the same definitions and differ only in
the number of individuals that should have an empty set of invasive options.
Hence our possibility results emphasize the similar causes that give rise to
these theorems.
Furthermore, conditions PM1 and PM2 involve in themselves some ad-
vantages as well. As stated in the introduction, the standard solution used
to solve Gibbard’s theorem is to forbid conditional preferences (condition
GL’). According to Gibbard’s [8], there exists a SDF satisfying conditions U
and GL’. The ideas included in conditions PM1 and GL’ are different: con-
dition GL’ prevents individuals from expressing conditional preferences in
their protected sphere, whereas condition PM1 allows individuals to decide
freely in their personal sphere, but compels them to respect individual rights
to decide freely too. Hence condition PM1 implies a reciprocity extended to
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all members of society: I have the right to act freely in my private sphere
and I admit that others have the right to do the same. In fact, the treatment
of individual rights requires to consider interactional issues. Thus we believe
that condition PM1 is more suitable than condition GL’ to solve Gibbard’s
theorem.
Moreover, condition PM1 examines how to apply a liberal collective choice
rule in a new light. We can define a liberal collective choice rule as that
which gives each person i an appropriate special voice on her feature and
implies a SDF. For instance, the proofs of our proposition 1 and Gibbard’s
theorem 3 (Gibbard [8], pp. 395-397) use this rule. Thus condition PM1
determines a domain different from that of unconditional preferences in which
the liberal rule can be applied. Therefore, the set of individual preferences
according to which all individuals express unconditional preferences is not the
maximal domain of the liberal collective choice rule. But it should be stressed
that the union of both domains – unconditional preferences’ and PM1’s – is
not the maximal domain of this rule either. We propose a simple example
to illustrate this point: consider two individuals 1 and 2 and X = {r, w}.
Thus, Xn = {(r, w), (w, r), (r, r), (w,w)}. Suppose that individuals 1 and
2 have the following linear orderings: (r, r) Â1 (w,w) Â1 (r, w) Â1 (w, r)
and (w, r) Â2 (w,w) Â2 (r, r) Â2 (r, w). Hence, it is easy to check that this
configuration of individual preferences is neither in unconditional preferences’
domain since individual 1 does not express unconditional preferences, nor in
PM1’s domain since both individuals have a strong preference which goes
against a preference of the other in her personal sphere. And yet no cycle
occurs. Consequently, condition PM1 shows that the liberal collective choice
rule can be applied outside Gibbard’s domain and thus it can be considered
as an extension of Gibbard’s result.
We consider next condition PM2. Most studies in the literature pro-
pose to solve the liberal paradox by weakening either the weak Pareto con-
dition (Farrell [5], Sen [26], Suzumura [29], Austin-Smith [2], Hammond
[10], Coughlin [4], Saari [20], Pétron-Brunel [17]...), or the condition of li-
beralism (Gibbard [8], Blau [3], Gaertner and Krüger [6], Krüger and Gaert-
ner [15], Wriglesworth [31]...). Obviously, the results we developed conflict
with Gibbard’s [8] and Blau’s [3], which suggest to weaken the condition of li-
beralism. Our view is entirely different: we support the respect of individ-
ual rights. It is therefore crucial to emphasize whether our results are more
pertinent than the former studies, which propose to weaken the weak Pareto
condition, especially Sen’s [26] and Pétron-Brunel’s [17].
In order to achieve a comparison between these propositions, the analyti-
cal concepts developed by Sen [26] and Pétron-Brunel [17] should be restated
in our framework, i.e., with a Cartesian product structure and with invasive
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preferences expressed via a specific set.
Definition 3 Set of invasive options à la Sen For a given d, the set
Y Senj is composed of all social states for which the individual j has a preference




y ∈ Di(a−i) | x Âj y for at least one x ∈ Di(a−i)
such that y Âi x
}






Condition 7 (PMSen) Preference Modification à la Sen ∃ j ∈ N
such that Y Senj = ∅.
We then obtain:
Proposition 3 (Restatement of Sen [26]) There exists a SDF satisfying
conditions PMSen, P, and GL’.
According to this restatement, the difference between our proposition 2
and Sen’s proposition is clarified: whereas both conditions PM2 and PMSen
state that at least one individual has to present an empty set of invasive
options, the ways these sets are defined by the two approaches are rather
distinct. On the one hand, the set Y Senj is composed of all social states for
which an individual j has a preference which is different from a preference
of another individual in her personal sphere. On the other hand, our set
of invasive options is composed of all social states for which the individual
j has a preference which goes against a preference of another individual in
her personal sphere. There are many more social states in the set Y Senj than
in our set since we only consider inverse strong preferences. Consequently,
condition PMSen is much more demanding than condition PM2: PMSen =⇒
PM2.
We then consider Pétron-Brunel’s [17]. The restatement of the definition
of the rank-difference between two social states proposed by this author fits
roughly our definition of strong and light preferences. And the condition
according to which the author constrains the domain of the collective choice
rule states that all individuals in society should have an empty set of invasive
options. We obtain:
Condition 8 (PMPB) Preference Modification à la Pétron-Brunel
Y PBj = ∅ for all j ∈ N.
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Proposition 4 (Restatement of Pétron-Brunel [17]) There exists a
SDF satisfying conditions PMPB, P, and GL’.
It is obvious that PMPB =⇒ PM2. Therefore condition PM2 seems to be
a relevant alternative to the results proposed by Sen [26] and Pétron-Brunel
[17] since it weakens the constraints they impose on individuals.
However one question remains: does this significant outcome come from
the Cartesian product structure? To answer it briefly, let us consider the
proof of proposition 2: in point (2), the Cartesian product structure is nec-
essary in order to guarantee the existence of a SDF with condition PM2.
Thus the Cartesian product structure enables us to go beyond the results
developed by Sen [26] and Pétron-Brunel [17] since on the one hand it allows
us to weaken the constraints imposed on individuals and on the other hand
it offers a better representation of individual rights.
6 Concluding remarks
The aim of the article is to devise a reliable way of overcoming two impos-
sibility results developed into a social choice theoretical framework thanks
to a Cartesian product structure, which makes it possible to take individual
rights into account properly. Some conceptual and formal tools are developed
so that the private sphere can be protected from invasive preferences. Ac-
cording to definitions 1 and 2, two new conditions for modifying preferences,
conditions PM1 and PM2, are designed. Consequently, original resolutions
of Gibbard’s and Sen’s theorems are deduced.
The Cartesian product structure matters since it provides improved so-
lutions for Gibbard’s and Sen’s results. First of all, the possibility results for
both theorems require the same conceptual and formal tools; thus the simi-
lar causes of these theorems are stressed. Secondly, the solution proposed to
Gibbard’s paradox thanks to condition PM1 emphasizes the reciprocity issue
present in this paradox in a more convincing way than the Second Libertar-
ian Claim does. Moreover, it extends Gibbard’s result by proposing another
domain in which the liberal collective choice rule can be applied. Thirdly,
the resolution of the liberal paradox, which uses condition PM2, improves
significantly Sen’s [26] and Pétron-Brunel’s [17] solutions.
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